Past as Prologue in the Affirmative Action Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court: Reflections on Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action by David L. Gregory & Sarah Mannix
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 89 
Number 2 Volume 89, Summer/Fall 2015, 
Numbers 2 & 3 
Article 4 
April 2016 
Past as Prologue in the Affirmative Action Jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court: Reflections on Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin and Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 
David L. Gregory 
Sarah Mannix 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David L. Gregory and Sarah Mannix (2015) "Past as Prologue in the Affirmative Action Jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court: Reflections on Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 89 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol89/iss2/4 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 56 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 56 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_GREGORY 4/6/2016 4:03 PM 
499 
PAST AS PROLOGUE IN THE AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT: REFLECTIONS ON 
FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT 
AUSTIN AND SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO 
DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
DAVID L. GREGORY† 
SARAH MANNIX†† 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 500?
I. ? THE FOUNDATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL EDUCATION AND IN 
EMPLOYMENT ...................................................................... 503?
A.? DeFunis v. Odegaard ................................................... 503?
B.? Regents of University of California v. Bakke .............. 505?
C.? United Steelworkers of America v. Weber .................... 507 
?
?
† Dorothy Day Professor of Law and Executive Director of St. John’s University 
School of Law Center for Labor and Employment Law; J.S.D., Yale Law School, 
1987. I thank research assistants Brendan A. Bertoli and Courtney Chicvak, St. 
John’s University School of Law Class of 2014, for their significant contributions on 
earlier drafts presented at the fifty-ninth and sixtieth annual meetings of the 
Education Law Association in 2013 and 2014. This Article was also presented as a 
featured roundtable at the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, at the St. John’s conference in conjunction with New York University Law 
School’s Center for Labor and Employment Law, April 4 to 5, 2014. I thank everyone 
who offered very helpful comments on these occasions, especially Professors Roberto 
Corrada and Melissa Hart of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and 
University of Colorado Law School, respectively. Special thanks to my great friend 
Dr. Charles Russo for introducing me to a host of interdisciplinary opportunities 
over the years and for inspiring this Article. Most impressive throughout has been 
my coauthor Sarah Mannix. In addition to her excellent research, she astonished 
everyone with her superb, impeccable presentation of this Article to the employment 
discrimination law classes at St. John’s University School of Law in 2013 and 2014. 
†† President, Labor Relations and Employment Law Society, St. John’s 
University School of Law, 2014–15; J.D., St. John’s University School of Law, June, 
2015; B.S., Cornell University, 2009. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 56 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 56 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_GREGORY 4/6/2016  4:03 PM 
500 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:499   
II. ? THE EXPANSION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 
REAGAN ERA ........................................................................ 509?
A.? Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education....................... 509?
B.? Piscataway .................................................................... 511?
C.? Johnson v. Transportation Agency .............................. 511?
D.? Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. ....................................... 512?
E.? Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC ................................. 514?
III.? ? AMBIVALENCE ...................................................................... 516?
A.? Hopwood v. Texas ......................................................... 516?
IV.? ? THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES ............................... 518?
A.? Grutter v. Bollinger ...................................................... 518?
B.? Gratz v. Bollinger ......................................................... 520?
V.? ? FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ..................... 521?
A.? Lower Court Decisions ................................................. 521?
B.? The Supreme Court Decision ....................................... 526?
C.? Remand to the Fifth Circuit ........................................ 533?
VI.? ? SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION ................................................................................. 537?
A.? Lower Court History .................................................... 537?
B.? The Supreme Court Decision ....................................... 539?
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 546?
 
INTRODUCTION 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin1 (“Fisher II”) is the 
quintessential proof that past is prologue.  Forty years ago, the 
affirmative action jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court was born out of a close interweaving of public sector higher 
education with private sector employment in, respectively, 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2 and United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber.3  The Bakke and Weber 
dynamic has controlled the evolution of affirmative action in the 
courts ever since. 
As Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter often counseled, 
the history of the law is in large measure the history of 
procedure.  In DeFunis v. Odegaard,4 the Supreme Court invoked 
?
1 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
2 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
3 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
4 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
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nonjusticiability and remanded the substantially, but perhaps 
not entirely, moot DeFunis case to the majoritarian political 
process.5  A half decade later, the Court promulgated the Bakke 
and Weber architecture that governs to this day. 
Fisher II, for all practical purposes, may be the functional 
equivalent of the DeFunis case forty years ago.  Likewise, 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action6 may be the 
broad analog to Bakke and Weber. 
This Article critically analyzes the dimensions and likely 
ramifications of Fisher and Schuette.  The principle of pragmatic 
political proportionality eschews the wholly ideological extremist 
views that would either utterly vitiate affirmative action or 
deeply embed it as a substantially obsolete elitist residue of 
endless recalibrating.  Instead, this Article subscribes to 
Lincolnian practical wisdom supplemented with a healthy dose of 
plain common sense.7  Enlightened political leadership should 
seek achievable pragmatic proportionality as the guiding 
principle controlling access to public institutions of higher 
education and, consequently, entry into the professions. 
Although affirmative action in higher education and in 
employment under Title VII has evolved differently, the salient 
Court decisions have been closely interwoven.  With these most 
recent Court decisions opening the door, there are likely to be 
future challenges to affirmative action.  The Court suggests that 
there is a compelling need for proponents to justify their 
affirmative action policies.  This resurrects the classic confluence 
of the standards for affirmative action in higher education and 
under Title VII.  The future of affirmative action is again up for 
debate.  The problem that affirmative action is designed to 
remedy—educational disparity among different groups—could be 
addressed by measures to enhance the educational system at the 
primary level.  More closely calibrating resources to primary 
school education would seem to be money better spent. 
?
5 Id. at 316, 320. 
6 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
7 The scholar whose position comes closest to the position of this Article is 
probably Professor Randall Kennedy, a prominent African-American professor at 
Harvard Law School. See Randall Kennedy, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW (Pantheon Books ed., 2013); Stuart Taylor Jr., 
Book Review: ‘For Discrimination’ by Randall Kennedy, WALL ST. J., 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324165204579026632266964524 
(last updated Aug. 30, 2013, 4:22 PM). 
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To withstand the judicial strict scrutiny applied to 
affirmative action, a university must show that its race conscious 
policy is narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest.8  
As the Court reiterated in Fisher II, the means to implement this 
compelling interest must be narrowly tailored.  “[T]he University 
must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain 
diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal.  On this point, the 
University receives no deference.”9 
The requirement that the university must narrowly tailor its 
goals to show that affirmative action measures are necessary 
presents an especially difficult problem:  “Narrow tailoring also 
requires that the reviewing court verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a 
university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of 
diversity.”10  How does one prove that it is necessary to use race?  
It is easier said than done, especially in light of Fisher II. 
In Fisher II, the Court held the following:  
In order for judicial review to be meaningful, a university must 
make a showing that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the 
only interest that this Court has approved in this context: the 
benefits of a student body diversity that “encompasses 
a . . . broa[d] array of qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important 
element.”11   
When this holding is read alone, it seems that Texas had 
done what was required.  The 2004 proposal and the creation of 
the many iterations of affirmative action show that the 
university has tried to narrowly tailor their plan.12  Race is only 
considered as one factor of the Personal Achievement Index 
(“PAI”) score, which is only considered if the applicant has not 
been accepted under the Top Ten Percent Plan.13  What the Court 
presented has left a wall that is too high to realistically 
overcome.  The Court punted in the outcome of Fisher, and the 
remand to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit left Fisher essentially in the same place as before it was 
decided.  The most recent affirmative action case, Schuette v. 
?
8 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
9 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
10 Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)). 
11 Id. at 2421 (alteration in original) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). 
12 Id. at 2416. 
13 Id. at 2415. 
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Coalition to End Affirmative Action,14 will not settle this 
uncertainty with race-conscious policies and may bring more 
constitutional challenges. 
The Court’s decision in Fisher II has spurred greater 
uncertainty in the law.  Ensuring a court could be satisfied that 
“no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the 
educational benefits of diversity”15 is very difficult.  Perhaps the 
money spent on litigating affirmative action suits16 could be 
better spent on targeted recruitment strategies and financial aid 
incentives tailored to low-income students.  In Schuette, the State 
of Michigan has effectively eliminated its laboratory for 
experimenting with affirmative action by enacting Proposal 2 
(“Prop 2”), now § 26, of the Michigan State Constitution.17  By 
upholding this amendment, the Court has given other states a 
way around affirmative action, but this could be to the detriment 
of the states.  Whether the effects of diversity as a compelling 
state interest are still a part of the discussion will remain to be 
seen and has already led to the return of Fisher II to the Court. 
I. THE FOUNDATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL EDUCATION AND IN 
EMPLOYMENT 
A. DeFunis v. Odegaard 
In 1971, Marco DeFunis, a white male, applied, and was 
denied admission to the University of Washington Law School.18  
The admissions committee used different procedures and criteria 
to evaluate minorities versus nonminorities.19  DeFunis, 
contending that the admissions committee’s criteria and 
procedures insidiously discriminated against him based on race  
 
 
?
14 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
15 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
16 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Texas Taps Mahoney, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 28, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/28/texas-taps-
mahoney; Justin Marion, How Costly is Affirmative Action? Government Contracting 
and California’s Proposition 209, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 503 (2009), 
http://people.ucsc.edu/~marion/Papers/Prop209_oct2007_revision.pdf. 
17 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629. 
18 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974). 
19 Id. 
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in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, brought suit in a 
Washington trial court.20  The Court granted certiorari while 
DeFunis was in his final year of law school.21 
In a five-to-four per curiam decision, the Court held that the 
case was moot because DeFunis would complete his studies at 
the law school by the end of the academic term independent of 
any decision the Court would reach.  In his dissent, Justice 
Douglas22 asserted that, instead of being selected by cultural 
background, minorities “should be chosen on talent and character 
alone.”23  Additionally, Justice Brennan stated that by dismissing 
the case as moot, the Court “disserve[d] the public interest.”24  
The Court should not “transform principles of avoidance of 
constitutional decisions into devices for sidestepping resolution of 
difficult cases.”25 
DeFunis is a landmark affirmative action case, primarily 
because it was the first occasion in which the Court considered a 
claim regarding race in the context of public university 
admissions policies.  This decision indirectly became foundational 
for future “reverse discrimination” challenges of racial preference 
programs.  By failing to reach the merits on the basis of 
mootness, the Court implicitly signaled the sensitivity and the 
difficulties of the issues.  Similarly, Fisher II sidestepped a 
resolution on the merits.26  The issue of possible mootness 
recurred in Fisher II during oral arguments.  Justices Sotomayor 
and Ginsburg probed Fisher’s counsel to demonstrate that there 
was an injury.27  The underlying difference may be the way the 
plaintiff’s injunctions were treated in the lower courts.  The state 
?
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 315. 
22 Justice Douglas was a Washington State native. He had also survived the 
1970 impeachment proceedings brought against him for his liberal positions on 
controversial issues which he detailed in his two-volume memoirs. See generally 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS (Random House 
ed., 1st ed. 1974); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939–1975, (Random 
House ed., 1st ed. 1980). 
23 DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting). There were twenty-six amicus briefs filed 
in DeFunis. One hundred twenty-three amicus briefs were filed in Fisher II. 
25 Id. 
26 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (holding that the appellate court 
applied the wrong level of scrutiny in upholding the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment). 
27 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–6, Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345). 
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trial court granted DeFunis an injunction, and by the time the 
dispute reached the Court, DeFunis was about to graduate.28  
The DeFunis Court perceived this as a no harm, no foul instance.  
In contrast, when Fisher sought an injunction compelling her 
admission to University of Texas, it was denied.29  Thus, she was 
never enrolled and went instead to Louisiana State University.  
Therefore, Fisher’s only injury was the application fee and the 
theoretical difference in job opportunities available to her as a 
nongraduate of the University of Texas.  Finally, there is the 
issue of the fractured decision that resulted when ruling on the 
basis of Article III grounds.  In a five-to-four split, the DeFunis 
majority signed their decision per curiam.30  The anonymity may 
indicate an underlying fear of becoming the next Justice Taney in 
legal history. 
B. Regents of University of California v. Bakke 
Allan Bakke,31 a white male, was denied admission to the 
University of California Davis School of Medicine.32  The medical 
school distinguished between underrepresented minority 
applicants and nonminority applicants and relied on a quota by 
reserving sixteen of one hundred seats in the incoming class for 
?
28 DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 314–15. 
29 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (noting that the trial court granted summary 
judgment for the university). 
30 The Court does not generally omit the name of the Justice penning the 
decision. In most instances, per curiam decisions are very brief, unanimous, and on 
uncontroversial topics. In DeFunis, the opinion was none of those things. 
31 Bakke was a thirty-seven-year-old mechanical engineer with stellar 
qualifications. Not only did he have n ROTC background, but he also showed drive 
and determination to attend medical school by taking night science classes to 
qualify. He had a 3.46 grade point average (“GPA”), with ninety-six percent verbal 
and ninety-four percent quantitative scores on the MCAT. Goodwin Liu, The 
Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2002). 
32 Bakke had applied twice before and was rejected on both occasions before he 
brought an action against the medical school. He was never waitlisted. When his 
first application was rejected, there were four special admissions seats unfilled at 
the time, but Bakke was not considered. After this first rejection, Bakke protested 
the special admissions program by writing a letter to the chairman of the admissions 
committee, alleging the program operated as both a racial and ethnic quota. In both 
years in which Bakke was rejected, other applicants were admitted to the medical 
school under the special admissions program with GPAs, MCAT scores, and 
benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke’s. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272–78 (1978); Liu, supra note 31. 
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minorities.33  Bakke alleged that the special admissions program 
distinguishing between minority and nonminority students 
discriminated on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, the California State Constitution, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 
Justice Powell’s plurality opinion was the most influential 
opinion issued from the fractured Court.  Relying upon the 
“Harvard Plan,” a diversity enhancing admissions plan Harvard 
College has used for decades, he opined that using quotas was 
illegal, but schools may consider race as one admissions factor.35  
Bakke therefore was entitled admission to the medical school 
because the medical school could not show that he would not 
have been admitted in the absence of the special admissions 
program.36  There were six separately authored opinions with no 
more than four Justices concurring in their reasoning on any 
point.  Five agreed that Bakke should be admitted, yet a different 
group of five agreed that a public school might constitutionally 
consider race in admissions under certain circumstances.37  This 
was the first time the Court addressed the constitutional issue of 
race when admitting students to a public university.  The Court 
set the groundwork for Fisher II, which reaffirmed Bakke, 
holding that under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment racial preferences must be examined 
with the “most exacting” strict scrutiny, that diversity was a 
compelling state interest, and that educators are in the best 
position to determine the policies to effectuate this goal.38 
 
?
33 The two admissions programs used by the medical school were the regular 
admissions program and the special admissions program. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273. 
34 Id. at 277–78. 
35 Id. at 316–20. 
36 Id. at 320. 
37 Id. at 271–72. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal 
Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1979) 
(exploring possible theoretical ramifications of the Bakke decision and examining the 
Bakke decision for broader themes in constitutional law including equal protection, 
procedural fairness, and structural justice); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 57, 131–48 (1978) (describing the holding and discussing the majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 55 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1 (2003) (critiquing the Court’s decision in Bakke). 
38 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417–19, 21 (2013); id. at 2422 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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The greatest difference between these cases is the division of 
the Court itself.  Bakke is notorious for its fractured decision and 
it is virtually impossible to derive overarching rules of law from 
the many opinions; the most heavily relied upon is the plurality 
opinion of Justice Powell.  Bakke left lower courts with little to 
work with, because Justice Powell’s opinion did not specify the 
circumstances under which race may be considered and only 
provided broad language to be interpreted.  The Fisher II Court 
reinforced Bakke in a seven-to-one decision and reaffirmed the 
application of strict scrutiny. 
C. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 
Brian Weber, a white male, and several white coworkers, 
applied for and were denied places in a company training 
program, which trained employees for skilled craft positions.39  
Pursuant to a master collective bargaining agreement between 
the United Steelworkers of America (“USWA”) and Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chemical Corp (“Kaiser”), Kaiser implemented a 
training program for current employees for craft positions.40  
Trainees were selected on the basis of seniority; half of the 
available positions were reserved for blacks.41  The Court 
described the selection process for the plan as follows:   
During 1974, the first year of the operation of the Kaiser-USWA 
affirmative action plan, 13 craft trainees were selected from 
Gramercy’s production work force.  Of these, seven were black 
and six white.  The most senior black selected into the program 
had less seniority than several white production workers whose 
bids for admission were rejected.42   
 
 
 
?
39 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979). 
40 Id. 
41 Kaiser’s purpose for this program was “to eliminate conspicuous racial 
imbalances in Kaiser’s then almost exclusively white craft-work forces.” Id. at 198. 
Kaiser and USWA voluntarily adopted the program. The program was temporary 
and sought to increase the number of black workers to meet the level of the local 
labor force. According to the employer, when this goal was met, the program would 
be eliminated. Specifically, at the plant where the litigation arose, prior to 1974, 
only 1.83% of the skilled craft workers were black, even though the local workforce 
was approximately 39% black. Id. at 198–99, 208–09. 
42 Id. at 199. 
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Weber instituted a class action lawsuit in federal district court on 
behalf of white production workers with greater seniority than 
those black workers admitted to the program.  He contended that 
the program discriminated on the basis of race in violation of 
Title VII.43 
The Court held that the Title VII prohibition of racial 
discrimination does not prohibit the use of affirmative action in 
all private and voluntary programs.44  Instead, the Court found 
that Kaiser’s affirmative action plan under the collective 
bargaining agreement that reserved fifty percent of the training 
program openings for black employees until the percentage of 
black craft workers was comparable with the percentage of 
blacks in the labor force did not violate Title VII.45  The Court 
reasoned that the program was permissible because the plan 
reflected the purpose of Title VII, it did not “unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of the white employees,”46  was only “a 
temporary measure,”47 and intended simply “to eliminate a 
manifest racial imbalance.”48 
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the Court 
usurped the role of the legislature, and that its decision was 
contrary to the explicit language of Title VII.49  Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent quoted 198450 to emphasize the dramatic 
leap the Court took to reach its decision when interpreting the 
language of the statute and the application of Title VII to 
employer-sponsored training programs.51  Education and 
employment are interwoven.  Without being trained to perform a 
?
43 Id. at 199–200. 
44 Id. at 208. 
45 Id. at 209. 
46 Id. at 208. 
47 Id. at 209. 
48 Id. at 208–09. 
49 Id. at 216 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
50 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, (Signet Classic 1950). 
51 Weber, 443 U.S. at 219–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see George Schatzki, 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise in Understandable Indecision, 
56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 51, 53, 73 (1980) (discussing the factors to consider when 
designing an affirmative action program in the workplace); see also Philip P. 
Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169 (2000) (examining the Weber 
decision retrospectively and its impact on the development of affirmative action 
policies); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 62, 253 (1979) (arguing 
that although the Court attempted to find a practical solution to compliance 
problems in Title VII, the Court went too far in approving voluntary affirmative 
action programs in the workplace). 
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job, an employee cannot ascend the employment ladder.  
Deficient job skills resulted in lower pay, as pointed out by the 
plaintiffs in both Weber and Fisher II in their challenges to their 
respective programs.52 
Unlike Fisher II, Weber did not rely on Bakke.  Comparing 
Weber and Bakke may elucidate this difference.  First, because 
Bakke involved a state university and raised the question of 
whether race-conscious programs violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, much of the Court’s decision was grounded in 
constitutional analysis.  Second, Weber challenged a private 
employer’s voluntary and temporary use of a program 
considering race in admissions to a craft program and thus was 
based on Title VII. 
II. THE EXPANSION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
IN THE REAGAN ERA 
A. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
In Wygant, a collective bargaining agreement between a 
school district and the teachers’ union provided that, in the event 
of layoffs, teachers with the most seniority would be retained, but 
there would not be “a greater percentage of minority personnel 
laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel 
employed at the time of the layoff.”53  When the district failed to 
follow the agreement, minority nontenured teachers, laid off 
rather than senior tenured nonminority teachers, along with the 
union, sued in federal court.54 
The Court held that strict scrutiny applied, but neither 
societal discrimination nor the role-model theory constituted 
compelling state interests.55  Justices Powell, Burger, and  
 
 
 
?
52 Weber argued that by not entering into the craft-training program, he would 
not be able to hold a craft position in the plant and thus would not receive higher 
wages. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199–200. Fisher argued that if she had obtained a 
University of Texas degree, she would have enjoyed more job opportunities. Fisher 
II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2413 (2013). 
53 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270 (1986). 
54 Id. at 271. 
55 Id. at 276. 
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Rehnquist further held that the agreement was not narrowly 
tailored to effectuate the parties’ goals because less intrusive 
methods, like hiring goals, were available.56 
Justices White and O’Connor concurred, opining that it was 
impermissible to achieve racial diversity in hiring by firing 
whites in lieu of blacks until a permissible number of blacks were 
reached.57  The agreement was not sufficiently tailored because it 
was tied to the number of minority students, which had no 
correlation to employment discrimination. 
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented, 
arguing that the majority had erred because it had confused 
unfairness with constitutional injury.58  The Court had not yet 
adopted strict scrutiny as the standard.  Even if that was the 
standard adopted, the agreement did not violate the Constitution 
because remedying past discrimination is a compelling state 
interest.  In addition, the agreement was a narrowly tailored 
means to achieve the compelling state interest because it equally 
apportioned the burden between the racial groups, and because it 
was reached through the bargaining process. 
Wygant is one of the first cases in which strict scrutiny 
appears in the form it exists in today:  Race conscious policies are 
appropriate only when there is a compelling state interest and 
the means used to effectuate that interest are narrowly tailored.  
Strict scrutiny still did not command a steadfast majority.  
Indeed, Justice Marshall disagreed that strict scrutiny was the 
proper test.59  Justice Marshall endorsed a much less rigorous 
standard.60  Minimally, four Justices agreed in Wygant that strict 
scrutiny is the correct standard.  The dissenters acknowledged 
the precedential value of strict scrutiny.61  Fisher II is an 
affirmation of Powell’s vision:  Strict scrutiny is the way to 
validate race-conscious policies and in Fisher, the Court achieved 
unanimity in equal protection jurisprudence. 
?
56 Id. at 283–84. 
57 Id. at 294 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring). 
58 Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 301–02. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 302–03. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 62 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 62 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_GREGORY 4/6/2016  4:03 PM 
2015] PAST AS PROLOGUE 511 
B. Piscataway  
The situation involving the Piscataway Board of Education 
may be the most memorable equal protection case that never 
was.62  The distinction between Wygant and the Piscataway 
settlement is that the former was a layoff case while Piscataway 
was a hiring case.63  Is the denial of benefits based on race or the 
extension of benefits based on race more egregious to the 
Constitution?  There is no clear answer.  Fisher involved 
university admissions, which could be either an extension or 
denial of benefits based on race, which raises philosophical 
questions about higher education in America.  One common 
refrain in American society is that college is the path to success.  
The federal government ostensibly endorses this view.64  At the 
same time, universities have a finite number of seats and there is 
no inherent right to higher education.  In addition, many people 
now criticize the higher education complex for failing heavily 
indebted students.65  If the higher education system is so badly 
broken, then denial of admission does not seem so injurious.  
However, if everyone should receive a college education, then 
denial of college admission is potentially a constitutional injury 
of great magnitude. 
C. Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
The Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County instituted 
a plan that “provides that, in making promotions to positions 
within a traditionally segregated job classification in which 
women have been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is 
authorized to consider as one factor the sex of a qualified 
applicant.”66  Paul Johnson, a male employee, sued. 
?
62 See Elizabeth Hull, Out on a Lonely Limb: The Piscataway Board of 
Education’s Fight for Educational Diversity, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 
407, 422–23 (2000) (discussing the Piscataway settlement in light of Wygant). 
63 Id. 
64 Matt Taibbi, Ripping Off Young America: The College-Loan Scandal, ROLLING 
STONE (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ripping-off-young-
america-the-college-loan-scandal-20130815. 
65 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-
union-address. 
66 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620–21 (1987). 
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Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and Blackmun 
held the promotion plan was constitutional.67  Employers 
adopting race conscious hiring policies need not show actual past 
discrimination but merely traditional underrepresentation.68  The 
plan did not consider sex dispositive, as it was taken into account 
with other factors.  The Court’s decision did not foreclose other 
voluntary programs that employers can create to benefit 
disadvantaged groups.  Justice O’Connor concurred in the 
judgment but wrote separately “because the Court has chosen to 
follow an expansive and ill-defined approach to voluntary 
affirmative action by public employers.”69  Justice Scalia 
authored the dissent, excoriating the Court for ensuring that sex 
would be the basis for employment decisions.70 
Johnson is quite distinct from Fisher II; the application of 
sex rather than of race means that strict scrutiny analysis was 
not implicated in Johnson.  The majority in Johnson noted that 
traditional underrepresentation can be the basis for policies that 
seek to expand minority presence—here, females—in a given 
field.71  However, this is somewhat irrelevant to strict scrutiny 
analysis, especially after Fisher II, since strict scrutiny has been 
further refined. 
D. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 
The Richmond City Council mandated that general 
contractors who were awarded construction contracts were 
required to reserve thirty percent of the contract’s value for 
subcontractors who were also minority business entities 
(“MBE”).72  This set-aside program was designed to promote 
minorities’ business ventures in public construction projects.  In 
implementing this plan, Richmond relied on a study which 
showed that Richmond’s population was 50% black, yet only 
0.67% of the city’s contracts had been awarded to MBE’s between 
?
67 Id. at 641–42. 
68 Id. at 630. 
69 Id. at 648 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
70 Id. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 630 (majority opinion). 
72 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477–78 (1989). To qualify 
as an MBE, the business must have been at least fifty-one percent owned and 
controlled by citizens who were “Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, 
Eskimos, or Aleuts.” Id. at 478. 
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1978 and 1983.73  Also, the city contractor associations had a 
limited number of minority businesses as members.74  The city 
relied on Fullilove v. Klutznick to adopt the ordinance.75 
The district court upheld Richmond’s set-aside plan, and was 
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, also relying on Fullilove v. Klutznick.76  The Court 
granted certiorari but remanded the case for further 
consideration after Wygant, whereupon the Fourth Circuit held 
that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.77  The Fourth Circuit held that broad 
findings of past discrimination did not justify this set-aside, and 
that thirty percent was not narrowly tailored.78  Richmond 
appealed; with an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Court 
affirmed.79 
Justice O’Connor wrote that strict scrutiny must be applied 
to all race-conscious measures, even benign ones; without using 
strict scrutiny, it was impossible to ascertain whether racial 
classifications were benign or produced by insidious racial 
discrimination.80  Richmond relied on generalized past 
discrimination, and the Court held that “an amorphous claim 
that there has been discrimination in a particular industry 
cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.”81  A city may 
only dismantle local discriminatory practices if it is shown that 
they have become a passive participant in a systematic exclusion 
of minorities.  Here, Richmond “failed to demonstrate a 
compelling interest in apportioning public contracting 
opportunities on the basis of race.”82 
Both Fisher II and Croson were brought under of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In both, the Court used strict scrutiny to 
evaluate the race-based policies.  In Croson, there were no  
?
73 Id. at 479–80. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 505 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533–35 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
76 Id. at 483–84. 
77 Id. at 485. 
78 Id. at 485–86. 
79 Id. at 486. 
80 Id. at 493. 
81 Id. at 499. 
82 Id. at 505. 
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race-neutral measures attempted to increase minority contracts 
awarded by the city, even though it was shown that bond 
requirements hindered minority subcontractors.83 
The Court’s holding in Fisher II that “[t]he reviewing court 
must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral 
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity”84 is a natural extension of the race-neutral alternatives 
first articulated in Croson.  The lack of deference to the 
generalized legislative intent in Croson is similar to the dynamic 
in Fisher II where the case was remanded to “assess whether the 
University has offered sufficient evidence that would prove that 
its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the 
educational benefits of diversity.”85  In Fisher II, the Court 
stated, “the mere recitation of a ‘benign’ or legitimate purpose for 
a racial classification is entitled to little or no weight.”86  Whether 
there was enough evidence in the record to be more than a “mere 
recitation” was remanded to the Fifth Circuit.87  Interestingly, 
Croson, which was seen as only applying to state or local actions 
in light of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, has suddenly become 
relevant again in light of Fisher.88 
E. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 
Metro Broadcasting was a consolidation of two federal cases 
that challenged the policies of the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.89  The FCC was granted authority by 
Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 to implement 
policies to increase diversity in broadcasting, and, thus, increase 
the dissemination of information from a variety of sources.90  To 
increase the minority ownership in broadcasting, the FCC gave 
?
83 Id. at 482. 
84 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
85 Id. at 2421. 
86 Id. (quoting Richmond, 488 U.S. at 500) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87 Id. at 2421–22. 
88 See generally Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the 
Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 679 (1995); John 
Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508 (1993); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against 
Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609 (1990). 
89 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990). 
90 Id. at 553. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 64 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 64 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_GREGORY 4/6/2016  4:03 PM 
2015] PAST AS PROLOGUE 515 
an enhancement wider credit for ownership and participation by 
members of minority groups, both in applications for new 
broadcast licenses and in “distress sales” of licenses.91  Whether 
this violated the equal protection rights under the Fifth 
Amendment was considered in light of the congressional support 
for the objectives of the FCC. 
The Court held that the FCC policies were constitutional, 
since they had “the imprimatur of longstanding congressional 
support” and were “substantially related to the achievement of 
the important governmental objective of broadcast diversity.”92  
Benign minority preference programs of the FCC were 
constitutional when sustained through intermediate scrutiny 
under the equal protection right of the Fifth Amendment.93  The 
Court held that Fullilove did not impose strict scrutiny on the 
program, and distinguished Fullilove from Croson, noting that 
Croson only applied to state and local government actions.94  The 
Court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard 
for assessing federal “benign” racial classifications.95  The 
majority—Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens—held that an interest in enhancing diversity in the 
broadcast industry was an important government objective and 
the FCC achieved that objective through substantially related 
means.96  These programs promoted increased minority 
participation rather than simply remedying past discrimination, 
which was an unprecedented expansion.  The Court gave 
deference to congressional objectives of enhancing diversity in 
broadcasting, accepting that it was an important government 
objective and the FCC’s polices were substantially related to the 
achievement of diversity.97  
Justice O’Connor argued for strict scrutiny in all racial 
classifications and that the compelling interest should be 
remedying past racial discrimination, something which was not  
 
 
?
91 Id. at 554. 
92 Id. at 600. 
93 Id. at 564–65. 
94 Id. at 565. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 566. 
97 Id. at 567–69. 
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shown by the FCC.98  This case was later overruled by Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,99 which held that strict scrutiny must 
be applied to federal laws with benign racial classifications.100 
The Court’s deference to the FCC’s stated purposes in Metro 
Broadcasting is similar to the Court’s deference to the 
university’s collective judgment in Fisher II.  Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to fully reconcile Metro Broadcasting with Fisher II, as 
Metro Broadcasting was overturned in favor of using strict 
scrutiny on all instances of racial classifications.101 
III. AMBIVALENCE 
A. Hopwood v. Texas 
Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliot, and 
David Rogers were white applicants denied admission to the 
1992 entering class at the University of Texas School of Law.102  
The plaintiffs challenged the law school’s affirmative action 
admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and claimed that they were subjected to 
unconstitutional discrimination in the application process.103  The 
school admitted applicants based on a number of qualifications, 
including their Texas Index (“TI”) score, LSAT score, and 
undergraduate grade point average (“GPA”).104 
The plaintiffs brought suit in the Western District of Texas, 
where the court held that the school violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because the admissions program was not 
sufficiently tailored to achieve the compelling interests of having 
a diverse student body and remedying past discriminatory effects 
on minorities.105  The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings, noting that the usage of discrimination 
based on race was highly suspect.106  On remand, the district 
court held that the applicants were not entitled to damages, but 
?
98 Id. at 611–12 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
99 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
100 Id. at 227. 
101 Id. 
102 Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood IV), 236 F.3d 256, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2000). 
103 Id. at 263. 
104 Id. at 265. 
105 Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood I), 861 F.Supp. 551, 578–79 (W.D. Tex. 1994). 
106 Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood II), 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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entered a permanent injunction proscribing consideration of race 
in the school’s admission process and awarded attorney fees to 
the applicants.107  Once again on appeal, the Fifth Circuit struck 
down the program and held that the government had not shown 
any compelling interests sufficient to justify the racially 
discriminatory admissions program.108 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding as binding precedent until Grutter v. Bollinger 
trumped Hopwood IV.109 
The Fifth Circuit held that diversity was not a compelling 
state interest for using racial classifications in admissions, 
rejecting Justice Powell’s arguments in Bakke, and ruled that 
any remedial justification for affirmative action had to be based 
on discriminatory actions by the law school.110  Considering race 
for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body was not a 
justifiable use of race; the law school’s methods did not withstand 
strict scrutiny.111  By holding one race as more befitting 
admission over another nonpreferred group, the school 
undermined the Equal Protection Clause,112 which halted racial 
preferences in the Fifth Circuit until Grutter. 
Hopwood IV was the impetus for the Top Ten Percent 
Plan.113  After Grutter, the University of Texas (“UT”) system 
supplemented the Top Ten Percent Plan with the Personal 
Achievement Index (“PAI”) at issue in Fisher II.114  Unlike the 
Texas Index score used in Hopwood IV, the PAI in Fisher II 
allowed the admissions officer to consider each applicant as an 
individual, with race being just a portion of the application.115  
The Texas Index singled out minorities for special review to the 
exclusion of whites.116  After the implementation of the holistic 
PAI, minority enrollment in the UT system dropped and the 
university was forced to expand outreach programs and other 
?
107 Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood III), 999 F. Supp. 872, 923–24 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
108 Hopwood IV, 236 F.3d at 273–75. 
109 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322, 343–44 (2003). 
110 Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 944, 952. 
111 Id. at 944–46, 949, 952, 955. 
112 Id. at 947–48. 
113 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013). 
114 Id. at 2415–16. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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means to reach minority students.117  However, when the 
university considered factors such as growing up in a non-
English speaking home, coupled with the operation of the Top 
Ten Percent Plan, it resulted in a more racially diverse 
environment at the university, even more so than before 
Hopwood IV.118 
IV. THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES 
The United States Supreme Court issued two opinions on 
June 23, 2003 that altered the landscape of affirmative action in 
university admissions.  In Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice O’Connor 
held for the Court that the University of Michigan Law School 
could use race as a nonnumeric “plus factor[]” in admissions 
decisions.119  In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court held that the 
University of Michigan could not reduce race to a numeric value 
to be used in admissions decisions.120  In Grutter, Justice 
O’Connor famously wrote that “[w]e expect that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to 
further the interest approved today.”121 
A. Grutter v. Bollinger 
The elite University of Michigan Law School sought a 
diverse mix of students.122  The admissions policy specifically 
sought a “critical mass” of students from underrepresented racial 
minority groups.123  This policy was challenged, and the Court 
held that strict scrutiny applied.124  The admissions policy was 
constitutional only if the government had a compelling state 
interest that it sought to satisfy through narrowly tailored 
means.125  “[T]he Law School ha[d] a compelling interest in  
 
 
 
?
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 2416. 
120 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255, 275–76 (2003). 
121 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
122 Id. at 314. 
123 Id. at 316. 
124 Id. at 326–27. 
125 Id. at 326. 
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attaining a diverse student body.”126  Namely, classroom diversity 
is important because the country should “cultivate a set of 
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”127 
The narrow tailoring prong was also satisfied.128  Quotas 
were impermissible, but a plan that used race as a plus factor 
was permissible.129  Justice O’Connor compared the University of 
Michigan Law School plan with the Harvard Law School 
admissions policy that Justice Powell approved in Bakke.130  
Michigan’s plan was not “racial balancing” because there was no 
numeric goal but rather a philosophical “critical mass.”131  
Although there may be other means to achieve a critical mass, 
narrow tailoring does not require the exhaustion of all race-
neutral options.132  The Court expected that in twenty-five years, 
race would not have to be used in university admissions 
policies.133  Race-based admissions policies should be periodically 
reviewed and eliminated as necessary.134 
Justice Thomas’s dissent quoted Frederick Douglass:  
“[C]olored people” should be given “not benevolence, not pity, not 
sympathy, but simply justice.”135  He agreed with the majority’s 
holding that racial discrimination will be illegal in twenty-five 
years because it was illegal at that time.136  Thomas concurred on 
two points.  First, racial discrimination between groups within 
the “critical mass” remains unlawful.137  Second, “in 25 years the 
practices of the Law School will be illegal” for the same reasons 
that they were illegal.138 
 
?
126 Id. at 328. 
127 Id. at 332. 
128 Id. at 339–40. 
129 Id. at 334–35. 
130 Id. at 335. 
131 Id. at 336. 
132 “Narrow tailoring” is required, but the most narrowly tailored method is not 
required. Id. at 339. 
133 Id. at 343. 
134 Id. at 342–43. 
135 Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
136 See id. at 351. 
137 Id. at 374–75. 
138 Id. at 375. 
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Twenty-five years earlier,139 Justice Powell wrote the 
plurality opinion in Bakke.  Justice O’Connor borrowed heavily 
from that opinion, and her forward-looking twenty-five year 
language did not end up in the majority opinion by accident.  
Scholars have speculated on possible reasons for the twenty-five 
year language, including a desire to legitimize the Court.140  
Some have interpreted this as a call to finally end racial 
injustice;141 others criticize this as an arbitrary time limit.142 
The academic achievement gap between racial groups is not 
likely to disappear in twenty-five years,143 and affirmative action 
disincentivizes minorities from improving their LSAT scores.144  
If the twenty-five year window is intended to mitigate the 
majority’s damage to strict scrutiny, future applicants will not 
find solace in knowing that Justice Powell’s basic protection is 
suspended for a full quarter century.145 
B. Gratz v. Bollinger 
The University of Michigan’s undergraduate admission 
policy awarded applicants twenty points out of one hundred 
possible points for belonging to an underrepresented minority 
group.146  Applicants belonging to nonminority groups who were 
denied admission sought injunctive relief for violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.147 
 
?
139 Note that no direct discussion of Justice O’Connor’s twenty-five year 
language appears in the Gratz opinion. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003). 
140 Vijay S. Sekhon, Maintaining the Legitimacy of the High Court: 
Understanding the “25 Years” in Grutter v. Bollinger, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 359, 
360 (2004). 
141 Wendy B. Scott, Panel Commentary Twenty-Five Years: The Future of 
Affirmative Action, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2053, 2060 (2004). 
142 Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 
CONST. COMMENT. 171, 183–84 (2004). 
143 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 376 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
144 Id. at 377. 
145 Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
146 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 256 (2003). 
147 Id. at 250–51. 
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Here, the Court found the university’s admissions policy was 
unconstitutional.148  Grutter established binding precedent that 
the university’s interest in classroom diversity satisfied the 
“compelling state interest” prong of the strict scrutiny test.149  
However, this admissions policy did not satisfy the “narrowly 
tailored” prong of the strict scrutiny test.150  The admissions 
policy lacked the individualized consideration first articulated in 
Bakke.151  The ability for an admissions officer to flag an 
application for review did not make the policy narrowly tailored 
because the award of twenty points was dispositive in many 
cases.152  The Michigan undergraduate admissions policy failed 
because it lacked nonracial distinctions between minority 
applicants.153 
The dissent in Gratz noted that “we are not far distant from 
an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-
sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our 
communities and schools.”154  Though indirect, this is perhaps the 
closest that the Gratz decision comes to referencing O’Connor’s 
twenty-five year language from Grutter.155 
V. FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
A. Lower Court Decisions 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher I”) was 
brought in the Western District of Texas, which granted 
summary judgment to the university, finding that the University 
of Texas (“UT”) had correctly applied the constitutional standard 
established in Grutter v. Bollinger and UT’s consideration of race 
as one admissions factor was narrowly tailored to support a 
compelling interest.156  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.157 
?
148 Id. at 268–76. 
149 Id. at 268–70. 
150 Id. at 270. 
151 Id. at 271. 
152 Id. at 273. 
153 See id. at 273–74. 
154 Id. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
155 Id. 
156 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 631 F.3d 213, 216–17 (5th Cir. 
2011). 
157 Id. at 247. The court held that, rather than seeking outright racial balancing 
for its own sake, the university’s policy was supported by the compelling interest of 
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The Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny while giving 
deference to the judgment of the university administrators and 
declined to evaluate Fisher’s Title VII claims.158  The court 
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
university.159  The Fifth Circuit synthesized three objectives for a 
critical mass of diversity160: enhanced perspectives,161 
professionalism, and civic engagement.162  To increase minorities 
in leadership positions, higher education must be open and 
inclusive of all qualified individuals of any race.163  The Fifth 
Circuit identified these as worthy objectives, as long as they were 
narrowly tailored, that is, a holistic evaluation of each 
applicant.164 
After Hopwood IV, UT had incorporated the personal 
achievement index (“PAI”) to be used in conjunction with the 
academic index.165  The PAI was meant to “identify and reward 
students whose merit as applicants was not adequately reflected 
by their class rank and test scores.”166  Though facially neutral, it 
was designed to increase minority enrollment as many of the 
factors used in the PAI disproportionately affect minority 
applicants.167  Despite the implementation of the PAI, minority 
applications immediately decreased, and there was a 
corresponding decrease in minority enrollment.  After Hopwood, 
African-American enrollment dropped forty percent and Hispanic 
enrollment decreased by five percent.  In the same period, 
Caucasian enrollment increased by fourteen percent and  
Asian-American enrollment increased by twenty percent.168 
 
?
achieving critical mass. Id. at 234–38. The court also found that the Texas Top Ten 
Percent Plan was not a constitutionally mandated replacement for the university’s 
policies and that the critical mass the university sought with its policies had not yet 
been achieved. Id. at 245. 
158 Id. at 231–32. 
159 Id. at 217. 
160 Id. at 219. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 219–20. 
163 Id. at 220. 
164 Id. at 220–21. 
165 Id. at 223. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 224. 
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Also after Hopwood IV, the Texas legislature enacted the 
Top Ten Percent Plan, which automatically admitted Texas 
residents in the top ten percent of their high school class to state 
universities.169  This increased minority percentages at UT 
because of the demographics of the State of Texas.170  Hopwood 
IV’s prohibition on using race ended after the 2004 admissions 
cycle with the Court’s decision in Grutter.171 
“UT commissioned two studies to explore whether the 
university was enrolling a critical mass of underrepresented 
minorities,” such that a Grutter-like system was unnecessary.172  
The university incorporated these findings into the 2004 
Proposal To Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions.173  The 
plan proposed that a “comprehensive college education requires a 
robust exchange of ideas, exposure to differing cultures, [and] 
preparation[s] for . . . an increasingly diverse workforce.”174  The 
proposal observed that these objectives were important to UT 
Austin as the flagship University of Texas.175  The results of the 
studies and of the objectives of the proposal caused UT to adopt 
race as one of the many factors used in admission.176  In addition 
to adding race as a factor, the university instituted informal 
reviews of the admissions procedure each year.177  The current 
Grutter-like policy has produced noticeable results; the UT 
system is ranked “sixth in the nation in producing undergraduate 
degrees for minority groups.”178  The current program is a tiered 
system where the Top Ten Percent Plan is used first, and the AI 
and the PAI winnow out the remaining applicants; race is one of 
the factors used in the PAI.179 
Given that UT’s admissions program differentiates between 
applicants on the basis of race, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and 
to withstand it, one must show that its policy is narrowly tailored 
?
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 224–25. 
172 Id. at 225. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 225–26. 
176 Id. at 226. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (W.D. 
Tex. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179 Id. at 227–28. 
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to effectuate a compelling state interest.180  However, the Court 
has counseled deference to a university’s educational judgment 
when evaluating race-based government action.181  The Fifth 
Circuit determined that strict scrutiny with “a degree of 
deference to the University’s . . . academic judgment” was 
appropriate, and the university’s decision-making process must 
be scrutinized under the good faith consideration of Grutter.182  
Grutter recognized that courts must afford a measure of 
deference to a university’s educational judgment, and the court 
must make this good faith determination that certain race-
conscious measures are necessary to achieve the benefits of 
diversity including attaining critical mass.183 
In deciding so, the Fifth Circuit determined that Fisher’s 
Title VII challenge did not apply to university admissions.184  
However, because university admissions treat race as part of a 
holistic consideration, this does not apply in the same way.185  In 
both Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education186 and City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.187 quotas were used, and in Ricci v. 
DeStefano188 a de facto quota was created.189  Conversely, no 
quota was present in UT’s admissions decisions.190 
Given that “diversity is a permissible goal for educational 
institutions, but ‘outright racial balancing’ is not[,] [a]ttempting 
to ensure that the student body contains some specified 
percentage of a particular racial group is ‘patently 
unconstitutional.’ ”191  It was clear that administrators know a 
quota system would not survive judicial review.192  The UT 
administration carefully fashioned its plan with guidance from 
Grutter and ensured that each individuals were evaluated on the 
entirety of their application.193  There was no indication that the 
?
180 Id. at 231. 
181 Id. at 232. 
182 Id. at 231–32. 
183 Id. at 233. 
184 Id. at 232–33. 
185 Id. at 233. 
186 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
187 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
188 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
189 Id.  
190 Id. at 235. 
191 Id. at 234 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003)). 
192 Id. at 235. 
193 Id. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 69 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 69 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_GREGORY 4/6/2016  4:03 PM 
2015] PAST AS PROLOGUE 525 
plan was a quota by another name.194  The university did not 
even keep “an ongoing tally of racial composition of the entering 
class” during the admission period.195  The percentage of 
minorities admitted did not support the appellant’s charge of 
racial balancing.196  Although race could enhance an applicant’s 
PAI score, every applicant could submit supplemental 
information to highlight his or her potential diversity 
contribution.197  Any consideration of minority group 
demographics happened only when the university studied 
whether a race-conscious admission program was needed to 
attain critical mass.198 
The Fifth Circuit held that UT policies demonstrated 
attention to the community it serves as the flagship state 
university.199  Both in Grutter and Fisher II, the relationship 
between numbers and diversity was recognized, however the 
court held that UT appropriately concentrated on the educational 
benefits.200  The need for a state’s leading educational institution 
to foster engagement and maintain openly visible paths to 
leadership for minorities required a degree of attention to the 
community, including demographics.201 
The Fifth Circuit evaluated the Top Ten Percent Plan 
because it also impacts minority enrollment.202  The appellants 
attempted to portray the Top Ten Percent Plan as a racially 
neutral alternative that would provide critical mass without 
resorting to race-conscious admissions.203 
Texas applicants outside the top ten percent of their class 
are faced with extreme competition to enroll at UT.204  This 
system negatively impacts minority students who have lower 
standardized test scores and are in the second decile of their 
classes at competitive high schools.205  Grutter’s—and UT’s—all-
encompassing look at an application may soften the exclusion of 
?
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 236. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 237. 
202 Id. at 238–42. 
203 Id. at 239. 
204 Id. at 241. 
205 Id. 
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minorities based on their standardized test scores.206  Though the 
Top Ten Percent Plan was adopted to increase minority 
enrollment, its blunt sweep of admissions is the opposite of an 
individualized, holistic focus.207  Appellants correctly noted that 
enacting this plan was not constitutionally required, however the 
Fifth Circuit held that this did not make the Grutter-like plan 
unconstitutional.208 
The Fifth Circuit did not appraise whether combining the 
Top Ten Percent Plan and the Grutter-style plan was the best 
possible choice.  Though racially neutral, the Top Ten Percent 
Plan uses demographics to create a proxy for race.209  Appellants 
contended that critical mass had already been reached and that 
benchmarks should be established, which the Fifth Circuit 
rejected.210  The Court in Grutter “pointedly refused to tie the 
concept of ‘critical mass’ to any fixed number.”211  Appellants did 
not show that UT did not act in good faith and it was also 
apparent from the 2004 proposal that UT had considered 
whether aggregate minority enrollment translated to diversity in 
the classroom.212  The Fifth Circuit determined that Grutter’s 
precedent supported UT’s plans and that it was not their role to 
move away from Grutter’s firm holding that diversity is a 
compelling state interest.213 
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher II”), 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, with Justices Alito, 
Roberts, Sotomayor, and Breyer; Justices Scalia and Thomas 
concurred, but wrote separately; and Justice Ginsburg 
dissented.214  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion has three parts.  
?
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 242. 
208 Id. at 243. 
209 Id. at 240. 
210 Id. at 242–45. 
211 Id. at 244. 
212 Id. at 245–46. 
213 Id. at 247. 
214 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013). It is interesting to note that Justices 
Roberts and Alito did not protest the essence of the majority opinion the way that 
Justices Scalia and Thomas protested. As conservative Justices appointed post-
Grutter, their acquiescence to the majority opinion suggests that they do not 
fundamentally challenge Grutter’s central holding, unlike Justices Scalia and 
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First, the prefatory language introduces the procedural posture 
and frames the issue.215  Second, part I states facts and 
introduces law.216  Part I, section A details UT’s various 
affirmative action plans over the last twenty years,217 while part 
I, section B speaks about Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, 
specifically in the race and affirmative action context.218  Finally, 
part II applies the facts to the law and concludes that the Fifth 
Circuit erred because it did not properly apply the narrow 
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny analysis.219 
Kennedy introduced the procedural posture of the case; 
generally, the petitioners complained that UT’s use of race in 
admissions decisions violated the Equal Protection Clause.220  
Further, Kennedy framed the exact issue: whether the judgment 
below was consistent with Grutter and Bakke.221 
Part I, section B of Justice Kennedy’s opinion discusses 
applicable Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.222  Three 
cornerstone decisions involving racial classifications in education 
are Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz.223  Justice Powell’s plurality 
opinion in Bakke held that all governmental decisions based on 
race are reviewable under Fourteenth Amendment strict 
scrutiny.224  Race-conscious admissions policies do not qualify as 
a “[r]edressing past discrimination” compelling state interest 
because a school’s academic mission is incompatible with the 
making of executive, legislative, or judicial findings of 
constitutional violations, which require remediation.225  Justice 
Powell cautioned, however, that the attainment of a diverse 
student body is complex, and diversity can certainly not be 
reduced to a simple numerical value.226 
?
Thomas who vociferously dissented in Grutter. Fisher II can be seen as a resounding 
announcement that classroom diversity is a compelling state interest. 
215 Id. at 2415. 
216 Id. at 2415–19. 
217 Id. at 2415–17. 
218 Id. at 2417–19. 
219 Id. at 2419–22. 
220 Id. at 2415. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 2417–19. 
223 Id. at 2417. 
224 Id. at 2418. 
225 Id. at 2417. 
226 Id. at 2418. 
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Grutter and Gratz are affirmations of Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke, but none of those cases gave university officials 
complete freedom to consider race:  Admissions policies must 
always withstand strict scrutiny with regard to narrow tailoring 
and compelling state interest.227  Courts must always begin with 
the presumption that racial classifications are inherently suspect 
and the government must prove its interests in a “[racial] 
classification [are] clearly identified and unquestionably 
legitimate.”228 
Part II of the opinion applies these facts to the law.229  Strict 
scrutiny must be used to review any admissions program in 
which race is used as a factor.230  Speaking to the compelling 
state interest prong, Justice Kennedy wrote that although 
educators have deference when making admission decisions, 
courts must ensure there is a principled, reasoned explanation 
for the decision.231  Justice Kennedy also noted that no party 
asked the Court to review the validity of Grutter.232  Thus, 
Grutter’s central holding remained intact.233 
Regarding the narrow tailoring prong, Justice Kennedy 
further opined that racial balancing—seeking a specific number 
or percentage of a minority group—is unconstitutional.234  When 
applying the narrow tailoring prong, courts must engage in 
“careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve 
sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.”235   
A court must be satisfied that “no workable race-neutral 
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity,” 
which the government bears the burden of demonstrating.236 
 
?
227 Id. at 2421. 
228 Id. at 2419 (alterations in original) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)) (internal quotation mark omitted). “[J]udicial review 
must begin from the position that ‘any official action that treats a person differently 
on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect.’ ” Id. at 2419 (quoting 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
229 Id. at 2419–22. 
230 Id. at 2419. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 2420. 
236 Id. 
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Justice Kennedy attacked the deference the Fifth Circuit 
gave UT to prove its admissions plan was narrowly tailored 
enough to survive strict scrutiny.237  Courts may not accept a 
school’s assertion that its admissions process used race in a 
permissible way without closely analyzing the evidence of how 
the plan works in practice.238  The narrow tailoring prong of strict 
scrutiny never changes, no matter how compelling the state 
interest may be.239  For this reason, the Court vacated the 
judgment and sent the case back to the Fifth Circuit for review 
under the correct standard.240 
Justice Thomas concurred that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly 
applied strict scrutiny; however, he wrote separately to explain 
why he would overrule Grutter.241  Justice Thomas explained that 
his rationale stemmed from Brown v. Board of Education.242  He 
discredited the arguments made in favor of affirmative action by 
comparing them to arguments made by segregationists.243  
Justice Thomas denounceed “benign” racism and explained how 
affirmative action hurts the minorities that it purportedly 
helps.244 
Justice Thomas explored the history of strict scrutiny 
jurisprudence, starting with the Fourteenth Amendment.245  The 
central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to require the 
government treat all citizens equally.246  Justice Thomas argued 
the use of race by the government demeans all people and is 
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.247 
Justice Thomas traced the origin of strict scrutiny to 
Korematsu v. United States.248  He noted two instances—besides 
Grutter—where the Court recognized “pressing public 
?
237 Id. at 2420–21. 
238 Id. at 2421. 
239 Id. at 2421 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 
(1982)). 
240 Id. at 2422. 
241 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
242 Id. at 2422–29. 
243 Id. at 2429–31. 
244 Id. at 2430–32. 
245 Id. at 2422. 
246 Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995)). 
247 Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
248 Id. at 2422–23. 
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necessity”249 that can constitute a compelling state interest: 
protecting national security250 and remedying past 
discrimination.251  Justice Thomas also noted cases where the 
Court rejected purported compelling state interests.252  First, the 
Court held that the government could not use race when 
determining the best interests of the child because “[p]rivate 
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, 
directly or indirectly, give them effect.”253  Second, providing role 
models for children did not constitute compelling state interest.254  
Finally, the notion that “black students are better off with black 
teachers” was rejected in Brown.255 
Justice Thomas also noted that Grutter was a radical 
departure from strict scrutiny precedents because it did not 
concern protecting a national security or remedying specific past 
racial discrimination.256  Rather, the Court deferred to the 
University of Michigan Law School’s bald statement that 
considering race was necessary in order to obtain the educational 
benefits that flow from a diverse student body.257  But there is 
nothing “pressing” or “necessary” about obtaining educational 
benefits from a diverse student body.258 
Justice Thomas refuted UT’s arguments in favor of its  
race-conscious admissions policy.  UT claimed its discrimination 
furthered two distinct interests: diversity for its own sake and 
the educational benefits that flow from attaining diversity.259  
But diversity for its own sake is a nonstarter because it amounts 
to “impermissible ‘racial balancing.’ ”260  Furthermore, the 
educational benefits that flow from attaining diversity are just as 
insufficient to support racial discrimination as the purported 
?
249 Justice Thomas refered to compelling state interests as “pressing public 
necessit[ies].” Id. at 2423 n.1. 
250 Id. (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944)). 
251 Id. (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500, 504 
(1989)). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
254 Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270–71 (1986)). 
255 Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
256 Id. at 2424. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003)). 
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educational benefits that flowed from segregation.261  Justice 
Thomas set up this part of the opinion by citing Brown and 
compared the illegality of segregation to the illegality of 
affirmative action.262 
The desegregation cases rejected the proposition that racial 
discrimination was necessary even if discrimination was 
necessary to the schools’ survival.263  The school board in Brown’s 
companion case, Davis v. School Board of Prince Edward 
County,264 had unsuccessfully argued that integration would have 
destroyed the quality of education that blacks received and forced 
schools to close, and that blacks would be the real victims of 
desegregation.265  Justice Thomas observed other cases where 
this argument failed.266  Indeed, the school closures Davis warned 
about eventually became reality, but the Court never retreated 
from its antidiscrimination principle.267 
Justice Thomas found that there was no rational difference 
between the form of racial discrimination advanced by the 
segregationists and the racial discrimination advanced by UT.268  
“Educational benefits are a far cry” from the compelling state 
interest necessary to justify the governmental use of race.269 
Justice Thomas cited slaveholder arguments that slavery 
helped to “civilize” blacks and elevated them as a race.270  In 
addition, segregationists argued the Jim Crow laws protected 
blacks from racist whites and “separate schools were in the ‘best 
interests’ of both races.”271  UT wanted the Court to accept the 
arguments of the slaveholder and the segregationist, but we 
know that “[r]acial discrimination is never benign.”272  The Court  
 
?
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 2424–25. 
263 Id. at 2425 (citing Davis v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954)). 
264 347 U.S. 483. 
265 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2425. 
266 Id. at 2426–27 (citing Brief for Respondents at 96, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44), 1950 WL 78682, at *96; Brief for Appellees at 32, Briggs v. 
Elliott, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1), 1952 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 11, at *50). 
267 Id. at 2426. 
268 Id. at 2428. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 2429–30. 
271 Id. at 2430. 
272 Id. 
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has held that all racial discrimination must be analyzed under 
strict scrutiny, even when the government has benevolent 
motives.273 
Justice Thomas explained that while UT’s plan harms both 
white and Asian students by denying them equal admissions 
standards, great harm is also done to those people admitted to 
UT under its plan.274  Blacks and Hispanics admitted to UT 
outside of the Top Ten Percent Plan are far less prepared than 
other applicants and have lower average GPAs and SAT scores.275  
Stunningly, UT and its amici never disproved the fact that 
minorities academically perform poorer than their peers and 
pursue less rigorous paths of study.276 
Finally, the plan stamped minorities with a lingering “badge 
of inferiority.”277  Their accomplishments were tainted by the 
notion that they were only admitted because of their race.278  
Furthermore, because there is no way to distinguish applicants 
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Plan and the PAI plan, all 
minority applicants suffer this fate.279  Justice Thomas concluded 
by repeating that he would overrule Grutter.280  However, 
because the Fifth Circuit did not correctly apply strict scrutiny, 
Justice Thomas concurred in the majority opinion.281 
Justice Ginsburg started her dissent by noting that UT 
modeled its admissions plan after the Harvard Plan that Justice 
Powell praised in Bakke.282  Furthermore, UT avoided quotas as 
required by Bakke and Gratz.283  Finally, Justice Ginsburg 
explained that UT and many other schools were sticking closely 
to what Grutter required.284 
?
273 Id. (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)). 
274 Id. at 2431. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 2432. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. (“In this case, for example, most blacks and Hispanics attending the 
University were admitted without discrimination under the Top Ten Percent plan, 
but no one can distinguish those students from the ones whose race played a role in 
their admission.”). 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 2432–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 2433. 
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Justice Ginsburg quoted her own dissenting opinions from 
the Gratz and Adarand decisions for the proposition that 
governmental actors—including universities—“need not be blind 
to the lingering effects of ‘an overtly discriminatory past.’ ”285  It 
is better that the government candidly discloses its use of race, 
rather than obfuscate its use.286  She noted that race is 
considered only as a factor, that the school went on a yearlong 
good-faith review period before instituting the policy, and that 
the school periodically reviews the necessity of the policy.287  
Nothing else was required by the Court’s precedents to satisfy 
the narrow-tailoring prong.288 
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the majority did one thing 
right:  It retained the central holding of Grutter.289  However, 
Justice Ginsburg affirmed because she found it unnecessary to 
send the case for further review.290 
C. Remand to the Fifth Circuit 
After the close of Fisher II at the Supreme Court, the 
judgment was vacated and remanded to the Fifth Circuit for 
more exacting scrutiny of the university’s diversity efforts.291  The 
Fifth Circuit reheard oral arguments, received additional briefing 
on the situation, reexamined with additional scrutiny as per the 
Court’s orders, and a divided panel—two-to-one—reaffirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment.292 
Though the Court ordered the Fifth Circuit not to defer to 
the university’s explanations or rationales, and the Fifth Circuit 
had closely examined both the admissions policies of the 
university and the facts of Fisher’s case, it nevertheless failed to 
“ensure that there is a reasoned, principled explanation for the 
academic decision” as per Grutter.293  In the Fifth Circuit’s 
?
285 Id. (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting)). 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 2434. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 2421 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Court of Appeals must assess whether 
the University has offered sufficient evidence . . . that its admissions program is 
narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”). 
292 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher III), 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
293 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. 
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defense, while Grutter and Bakke are still good law, this directive 
is unworkable and requires the court to take on the roles of social 
scientist, statistician, and God to make a determination whether 
UT Austin’s—or any university’s—plan would be acceptable.  In 
the majority opinion, the court took a close look at the evolution 
of the admissions program at UT Austin and examined Fisher’s 
claims in depth; the court strictly scrutinized the changes in 
demographics effectuated by each admissions program.294 
The opinion is divided up between review of the university’s 
admissions policies, whether the case should be remanded back 
to the district court, an analysis of the standard from Grutter and 
an application of the Fisher II facts to the Grutter standard, as 
well as an in depth explanation of the difficulties of applying the 
“critical mass” with any certainty.295  The increased scrutiny that 
the Court ordered was shown in the Fifth Circuit review of the 
Top Ten Percent Plan, the academic index, the personal 
achievement index (“AI” and “PAI”) scores, and the holistic 
review of the application.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
Fisher would not have been admitted to the university under any 
of her scores.296  The Fifth Circuit addressed the “factual 
developments since summary judgment” and questioned whether 
Fisher had standing to pursue this case any longer.297  The Fifth 
Circuit found that Fisher did have standing to review and denied 
the university’s motion for remand to the district court.298  The 
Fifth Circuit set out its task from the Court:  “In remanding, the 
Supreme Court held that its decision in Grutter requires that 
‘strict scrutiny must be applied to any admissions program using 
racial categories or classifications’; that ‘racial classifications are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further 
compelling governmental interests.’ ”299  The Fifth Circuit then 
examined the different admissions programs in the light of 
Justice Powell’s conclusion, “attainment of a diverse student 
body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of 
higher education,”300 which was stated in Bakke but endorsed by 
?
294 Fisher III, 758 F.3d at 637–39. 
295 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2415. 
296 Fisher III, 758 F.3d at 638–39. 
297 Id. at 639. 
298 Id. at 640–42. 
299 Id. at 642. 
300 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978). 
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both Grutter and Fisher II.301  The court discussed the difficulty 
of attaining diversity without the usage of quotas and while 
maintaining the richness of experiences and other characteristics 
that can impact diversity without being deemed “outright racial 
balancing.”302  A university will receive no deference on whether 
the “means chosen to accomplish the [university’s] asserted 
purpose . . . be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish 
that purpose.”303  This narrow tailoring requirement mandates 
that a university demonstrate that it attempted to implement 
race-neutral policies to effectuate the same goals before using 
race.304 
In order to assess whether the narrow tailoring was present, 
the circuit court began with Hopwood IV and traced the evolution 
of the Top Ten Percent Plan and the impacts that it had, namely 
admitting more white students than minorities.305  The court 
found that the demographics of the State of Texas, the Top Ten 
Percent Plan, and the holistic review operated to lower the 
number of minorities after their implementation.306  These 
realities highlight the difficulty of an approach that seeks to 
couch the concept of “critical mass” within numerical terms.  The 
court rehashed the process of how the university’s admission 
policy had come to be and commended the university’s efforts and 
constant restructuring of the program to maintain diversity, 
though diversity is difficult to define.307  The majority held that 
“[t]o reject the UT Austin plan is to confound developing 
principles of neutral affirmative action, looking away from Bakke 
and Grutter, leaving them in uniform but without command—due 
only a courtesy salute in passing.”308  This quote sets the stage for 
this case to return to a higher court, and with the return of this 
unsatisfyingly derivative ruling, perhaps the Court will be forced 
to clarify the framework promulgated by Grutter v. Bollinger. 
 
 
?
301 Id. 
302 Fisher III, 758 F.3d at 643. 
303 Id. at 644 (alterations in original). 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 645. 
306 Id. at 646. 
307 Id. at 647–49. 
308 Id. at 660. 
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UT has implemented a Grutter-like plan, using race as only 
one factor in its holistic review, but “this record of its necessary 
use of race in a holistic process and the want of workable 
alternatives that would not require even greater use of race, 
faithful to the content given to it by the Supreme Court.”309 
The dissent blasted both the majority and UT for having the 
undefined “critical mass” as the goal of the university’s diversity 
efforts.310  Circuit Judge Garza dissented again in this case, his 
major qualm with the majority being that they have yet again 
failed to strictly scrutinize the admissions policy, as it is 
impossible to do so without a clear understanding of the 
university’s “compelling interest” in diversity.311  Because the 
Court clarified the strict scrutiny standard as applicable to racial 
classifications in higher education, but reviewing courts cannot 
defer to a state actor’s argument that its consideration of race is 
narrowly tailored to achieve its diversity goals, the court is in a 
difficult quandary of how to balance the school’s goals with the 
lack of deference.  Judge Garza noted that a public university 
could define its end goal adequately, but UT had not done so.312 
Given the extensive research and trial and error undertaken 
by UT since 1997, it is difficult to imagine a more arduous 
process to gain such a nebulous result.  After this decision, it 
seems the only possibilities are to appeal to the Fifth Circuit to 
review en banc or to go back to the Supreme Court.  The 
difficulty expressed in Judge Garza’s dissent is perhaps the crux 
of the issue—it is difficult for lower courts to apply the ends and 
means analysis.  Additionally, because courts cannot truly assess 
whether the use of racial classifications are necessary and 
narrowly tailored to a university’s goals, cases like Fisher are 
destined to hang in limbo until the Court decrees definitive 
guidelines that can be applied by lower courts. 
?
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 661 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
311 Id. at 665. 
312 Id. at 666. 
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VI. SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO  
DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
A. Lower Court History 
The question certified for review in Schuette is “whether a 
state violates the Equal Protection Clause by amending its 
constitution to prohibit race- and sex-based discrimination or 
preferential treatment in public-university admissions 
decisions.”313  Although Schuette belongs to the family of 
affirmative action Supreme Court cases, the case has presented 
some unique issues. 
Over the years, Michigan has become a laboratory for 
affirmative action litigation.  The controversies surrounding 
Gratz and Grutter both originated in the Wolverine State, 
Michigan.  Following those decisions, the Gratz lead plaintiff, 
Jennifer Gratz, spearheaded a ballot challenge to affirmative 
action programs in Michigan.314  Gratz and her associates placed 
Proposition 2 (“Prop 2”) on the ballot, which “bar[red] programs 
for state school admission, public employment, and public 
contracting [from] grant[ing] preferential treatment on the basis 
of race or gender.”315  Although proponents faced initial 
difficulties, Prop 2 passed and went into effect on December 23, 
2006.316 
Litigation ensued:  Interest groups brought suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan.317  The district court made several findings and 
ultimately found Prop 2 constitutionally permissible.318  First, the 
opponents of Prop 2 did not have standing to challenge the law 
on First Amendment grounds.319  Second, Prop 2 did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause because it did not have a 
?
313 Mary Pat Dwyer, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21, 2013, 10:36 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/petition-of-the-day-422/. 
314 James Taranto, The Woman Who Fought Racial Preference, WALL ST. J., 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732341960457857004195716554
4 (last updated Jun. 28, 2013, 7:06 PM). 
315 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 924, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2008), aff’d, 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. 
Ct. 1623 (2014). 
316 Id. at 932; see MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
317 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 929. 
318 Id. at 960. 
319 Id. at 944. 
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discriminatory purpose,320 nor did Prop 2 violate the equal 
protection rights of minority applicants under the “political 
process” theory.321  Finally, the district court held that neither 
Title VII nor Title IX preempted Prop 2, because neither law 
requires preferential treatment for minority groups for the state 
to receive federal funding.322 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed.323  Upon rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit 
held that Prop 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
made the processes of government decision making turn on the 
racial nature of the issue being considered.324 
In addressing the issues, the Sixth Circuit did not evaluate 
“the constitutional status or relative merits of race-conscious 
admissions policies as such.”325  This court did not evaluate Prop 
2 under a traditional equal protection analysis because it found 
that the political-process doctrine had been violated which was to 
find Prop 2 unconstitutional.326  The Court used the tests found 
in the cases of Hunter and Seattle that emphasized that the 
Equal Protection Clause is a guarantee that minorities may 
participate meaningfully in the political process and ensures that 
the political process is fair for all players.327  The Court 
explained: 
[A law] deprives minority groups of the equal protection of the 
laws when it: (1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or 
program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority’;  
 
 
?
320 Id. at 953. 
321 Id. at 957–58; see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387 (1968) (holding that 
a referendum to require the approval of an electoral majority before any ordinance 
regulating real estate “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or 
ancestry” was unconstitutional); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 
U.S. 457, 472 (1982) (holding that the initiative that prohibited mandatory busing 
which “inure[d] primarily to the benefit of the minority” was unconstitutional 
because it reallocated political power unfairly). 
322 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 959. 
323 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 
607, 610 (6th Cir. 2011), superseded on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2012), 
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
324 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 
466, 470 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
325 Id. at 473. 
326 Id. at 485. 
327 Id. at 474. 
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and (2) reallocates political power or reorders the 
decisionmaking process in a way that places special burdens on 
a minority [group].328 
The Court further found that the program had a racial focus 
because the admissions policies, which Prop 2 banned, “inure[d] 
primarily to the benefit of the [racial] minority.”329  The Court 
also found that Prop 2 reordered the political process through the 
elected board of directors, which shaped the admissions policies 
for the state universities named in the suit.330  In addition, the 
only way to change the law was to amend the Michigan State 
Constitution, a significant hurdle.331  The Sixth Circuit denied 
the State’s contention that Hunter and Seattle were inapplicable 
to Prop 2 because those cases governed “enactments that burden 
racial minorities’ ability to obtain protection from discrimination” 
instead of minorities’ ability “to obtain preferential treatment.”332 
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
Although the Court explicitly stated that this case was not 
an indication of the merits of race-conscious admissions policies 
in higher education,333 the implications of this case will have far 
reaching effects on race-conscious policies, educational or 
otherwise.  The importance of this issue is highlighted by the 
plurality opinion, with most Justices putting their opinions on 
the record.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, held that 
no constitutional authority would allow the judiciary to set aside 
an amendment to the Michigan Constitution prohibiting 
affirmative action in public education, employment, and 
contracting.334  Chief Justice Roberts concurred, Justices Scalia 
and Thomas concurred in judgment separately, Justice Breyer 
concurred in judgment separately, and Justice Sotomayor 
dissented with Justice Ginsburg joining her.  Justice Kagan did 
not take part in the decision.335 
?
328 Id. at 477 (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472 
(1982)). 
329 Id. at 479. 
330 Id. at 480. 
331 Id. at 484. 
332 Id. at 485. 
333 Schuette v. Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014). 
334 Id. at 1638. 
335 Id. 
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The Court took special care to distinguish this case from 
Fisher before delving into this case.  In the Court’s short opinion, 
Justice Kennedy explained why the cases used in the lower court 
did not apply to Prop 2.336  The three cases discussed by the 
plurality were Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,337 
Hunter v. Erickson,338 and Reitman v. Mulkey.339  Seattle and 
Hunter led the Sixth Circuit to decide that section 26 was 
unconstitutional based on the political-process doctrine.340  In 
Hunter, Mulkey, and Seattle, insular groups were injured by 
legislation.341  The political-process doctrine is triggered when a 
law reallocates policymaking authority on a racial issue, the first 
prong of the analysis.  At that point, the Court must determine 
whether the law will put the “effective decisionmaking authority 
over . . . racial issue[s] at a different level of government,” the 
second prong.342  Though the political-process doctrine is linked to 
equal protection, the Sixth Circuit incorrectly applied this 
standard.  The difficulties of applying this standard correctly 
made the political-process doctrine inappropriate, as stated by 
the Court:   
Were courts to embark upon this venture not only would it be 
undertaken with no clear legal standards or accepted sources to 
guide judicial decision but also it would result in, or at least 
impose a high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon 
demeaning stereotypes, classifications of questionable 
constitutionality on their own terms.343 
The Sixth Circuit read Seattle to hold that a state action 
with a racial focus that made it difficult for racial minorities to 
effectuate legislation in their interest is subject to strict 
scrutiny.344  The Court held that this was an overly expansive 
interpretation of Seattle that did not have precedential support 
but had troubling implications at odds with established Equal 
?
336 Id. at 1634. 
337 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
338 393 U.S. 385 (1969).  
339 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
340 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 
466, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
341 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633. 
342 Id. at 1643, 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
343 Id. at 1635 (plurality opinion). 
344 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 488. 
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Protection Clause jurisprudence.345  Section 26 did not 
demonstrate injury as in Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle.  The Court 
determined that the issue is merely whether “voters may 
determine whether a policy of race-based preferences should be 
continued.”346  The Court explained that if Seattle were to control, 
future courts would be compelled to “determine and declare 
which political policies serve the ‘interest’ of a group defined in 
racial terms,” something that a court is not equipped to do and 
which is at odds with the Constitution.347  In Mulkey, Hunter, and 
Seattle, the challenged policies were used, or likely to be used, to 
injure citizens by reason of race.  The plurality analogized 
Schuette to Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson348 and held 
that an equal protection analysis was appropriate.349  In Wilson, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that barring racial preferences in public education was 
constitutional;350 this ruling would be called into question if the 
lower court’s analysis were correct.  At issue is whether voters 
can determine whether racial preferences may be used, not 
whether not addressing or preventing an injury on the basis of 
race, is constitutional.  The Court distinguished Prop 2: 
Here Michigan voters acted in concert and statewide to seek 
consensus and adopt a policy on a difficult subject against a 
historical background of race in America that has been a source 
of tragedy and persisting injustice.  That history demands that 
we continue to learn, to listen, and to remain open to new 
approaches if we are to aspire always to a constitutional order 
in which all persons are treated with fairness and equal dignity.  
Were the Court to rule that the question addressed by Michigan 
voters is too sensitive or complex to be within the grasp of the 
electorate; or that the policies at issue remain too delicate to be 
resolved save by university officials or faculties, acting at some 
remove from immediate public scrutiny and control; or that 
these matters are so arcane that the electorate’s power must be 
limited because the people cannot prudently exercise that power 
even after a full debate, that holding would be an 
unprecedented restriction on the exercise of a fundamental 
?
345 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634. 
346 Id. at 1636. 
347 Id. at 1634. 
348 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997). 
349 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636. 
350 Wilson, 122 F.3d at 702. 
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right held not just by one person but by all in common.  It is the 
right to speak and debate and learn and then, as a matter of 
political will, to act through a lawful electoral process.351 
The takeaway of this opinion was that the Michigan voters 
should not be disempowered to decide on a matter of public 
importance; Schuette is not a case about how racial preferences 
should be resolved, but rather who may resolve them.  Schuette’s 
plurality opinion is deceptively short, but the differing opinions 
of each Justice shed more light on what the Justices believe 
should control this case.  The Justices are entrenched in their 
viewpoints with an unsatisfying resolution overall. 
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring, wrote separately to scold 
the dissent for having a lengthy opinion and to declare that 
“[p]eople can disagree in good faith on this issue, but it similarly 
does more harm than good to question the openness and candor 
of those on either side of the debate.”352  Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence stated that he continues “to believe that the 
Constitution permits, though it does not require,” affirmative 
action, and though the problems intended to be fixed by 
affirmative action endure, the political-process doctrine does not 
fit the facts at hand.353  Further, Justice Breyer would allow the 
workings of democracy to take their course instead of overturning 
them by judicial decree.354 
Justice Scalia concurred in judgment with this holding, 
joined by Justice Thomas, writing an opinion full of fire and 
brimstone in support of the holding but disagreeing with the 
rationale of the case; he thought it was ludicrous that the Court 
considered the question presented.355  Justice Scalia agreed with 
the plurality that the political-process doctrine, established by 
Hunter and Seattle, was not the appropriate standard, but he 
would have gone further and overturned those cases as contrary 
to equal protection jurisprudence.356  The plurality reinterpreted 
those decisions to support their conclusion, whereas Justice 
Scalia would have simply reaffirmed that equal protection 
?
351 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637. 
352 Id. at 1638–39 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
353 Id. at 1649–51 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
354 Id. at 1649–50. 
355 Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
356 Id. at 1640. 
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violations require a showing of discriminatory intent.357  The 
issue Justice Scalia found with regard to the political-process 
doctrine was that it gives courts too much leeway in finding a 
“racial issue.”358  Additionally, Justice Scalia opined that the 
plurality misinterpreted the Equal Protection Clause as applying 
to groups instead of all persons.359  The second prong of the 
political-process doctrine conflicts with the idea of state 
sovereignty and would create a reverse preemption effect by 
preventing states from delegating decision-making authority to 
any subordinate entity.  Justice Scalia’s concurrence criticized 
the dissent’s notion that the existing political process has been 
changed, because the voters in Michigan had used the 
established political process.360  Justice Scalia would have 
explicitly reaffirmed that discriminatory purposes must be shown 
for an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; 
and he would have held that a facially neutral law such as 
section 26 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment without a showing of discriminatory 
intent.361 
The dissent equated eliminating racial preferences in higher 
education with the historical oppression minority groups have 
faced in this country.  In increasingly hyperbolic tones, Justice 
Sotomayor’s lengthy dissent, about how the plurality incorrectly 
applied precedent and fundamentally misunderstands the 
problem with Prop 2, now section 26, maintained that the 
judiciary should have intervened in this case in order to advance 
equality.362  Justice Sotomayor took a historical journey through 
constitutional law, from the passing of the Fifteenth Amendment 
and the history of reconstruction-era legislation to the hurdles 
faced by minorities in the political process.363  In this historical 
framework, Justice Sotomayor defended the political-process 
doctrine that the plurality was eager to disregard.364  The dissent 
contended that Schuette is like Hunter and Seattle, and similarly, 
a majority of voters may not “suppress the minority’s right to 
?
357 Id.  
358 Id. at 1643. 
359 Id. at 1644. 
360 Id. at 1646–47. 
361 Id. at 1648. 
362 Id. at 1653–54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
363 Id. at 1654–57. 
364 Id. at 1656–59. 
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participate on equal terms in the political process.”365  The 
dissent equated section 26 with the racially-motivated legislation 
in Hunter and Seattle and would overturn section 26.366  Justice 
Sotomayor contended that the enactment of section 26 has 
“changed the basic rules of the political process . . . in a manner 
that uniquely disadvantaged racial minorities.”367  Though she 
noted that after Grutter voters were free to pursue the end of 
affirmative action in a number of ways, she took issue with their 
amendment of the state constitution.  Her dissent seems to decry 
section 26 because of personal feelings and not on legal 
precedent.  Her argument for how the amendment unfairly 
burdened racial minorities is premised on the fact that alumni of 
the University of Michigan can lobby to change admissions 
policies in ways that would benefit other groups, such as legacy 
applicants, while racial minorities hoping to change admissions 
policies must now change the state constitution.  While there is a 
disparity between the difficulties of lobbying a school to change 
its policies and lobbying for a change to the state constitution, it 
remains that the voters of Michigan enacted this policy.  The 
democratic system provides for a majority rule and perhaps the 
tyranny of the majority should be avoided in some cases, but is 
an amendment explicitly outlawing racial preferences that case?  
Justice Sotomayor addressed this issue:  “The Constitution does 
not protect racial minorities from political defeat.  But neither 
does it give the majority free rein to erect selective barriers 
against racial minorities.”368 
Justice Sotomayor looked at the impact of affirmative-action 
policies and how minority enrollment drops when only race-
neutral selection policies are implemented, and she suggested a 
parade of horribles of what would happen if race-neutral policies 
were used exclusively.369  Her extensive look into the policies was 
criticized by the plurality, and her dissent seems to be an 
attempt to see what sticks, especially because she ended with 
“[t]o be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the virtues of 
adopting race-sensitive admissions policies should inform the 
legal question before the Court today regarding the 
?
365 Id. at 1657, 1659. 
366 Id. at 1659–60. 
367 Id. at 1652. 
368 Id. at 1683. 
369 Id. 
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constitutionality of § 26.”370  This admission makes it seem that 
Justice Sotomayor supports the legal analysis of the plurality 
and that her issue was with the precedent this case will set.  
Justice Sotomayor continued: 
The Constitution does not protect racial minorities from 
political defeat.  But neither does it give the majority free rein 
to erect selective barriers against racial minorities.  The 
political-process doctrine polices the channels of change to 
ensure that the majority, when it wins, does so without rigging 
the rules of the game to ensure its success.  Today, the Court 
discards that doctrine without good reason.371 
Justice Sotomayor has gone on the record that she would uphold 
affirmative action as a public policy matter, however this was not 
the case to make that holding.372 
Schuette is a fairly straightforward case if the political-
process doctrine can be shunted aside and resolved as an equal 
protection issue.  By involving the political-process doctrine and 
the history of discrimination in the United States, what could be 
simply resolved devolves into an examination of every wrong and 
instance of invidious discrimination in the history of the United 
States, all for a case that explicitly deigns not to consider the 
constitutionality of affirmative action based on racial 
preferences.  This case has established a Supreme Court 
sanctioned way for those against affirmative action to dispose of 
it neatly and constitutionally.  The interplay between deciding 
this case as a straightforward equal protection claim, versus the 
convoluted and subjective test of the political-process doctrine, 
makes this case interesting, but what will be more interesting is 
the outcome of affirmative action.  As the Fisher case returns 
from the Fifth Circuit, the time seems ripe for another challenge 
and a call for the Supreme Court to clarify the guidelines of 
affirmative action, and for a definitive decision to be reached.  On 
November 12, 2014, the Fifth Circuit announced that it would 
not rehear this case en banc, which means it is headed back to 
the Supreme Court.373 
?
370 Id. 
371 Id. 
372 Id. 
373 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 771 F.3d 274, 274 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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CONCLUSION 
Fisher II and Schuette have tacitly endorsed the operation of 
affirmative action in higher education and employment, although 
its perch is precarious.  After forty years of contentious litigation 
in more than a dozen highly charged cases, the Roberts Court 
undoubtedly understands the operational parameters of 
affirmative action.  Affirmative action is not a perfect 
methodology; rather, it is a flawed theory.  But, given the reality 
of deeply embedded racism and the hyperutility of higher 
education as the gatekeeper to professional employment, 
affirmative action is an indispensable mechanism to provide the 
rough justice of pragmatic political proportionality. 
Essentially, the kaleidoscopic panorama of racial groups in 
the understandably fair share of tangible benefits accompanied 
by professional employment is predicated on successful higher 
education.  Ergo, the role and the reality of affirmative action 
will be a redistributionist tool for the foreseeable future.  Rather 
than dictate its demise, Fisher II and Schuette may have 
solidified affirmative action for well more than the next twenty-
five years.  Affirmative action is perhaps the most effective 
instrument for periodically recalibrating pragmatic, political 
proportionality.  Because affirmative action is utilized at many 
levels, and no other policy instrument has a proven track record, 
thus far, there has been no effective equivalent. 
Although Fisher II and Schuette left unanswered some 
important questions about the status of affirmative action, the 
most recent decisions still made important contributions.  The 
Fisher II decision is significant in several different ways.  First, 
Fisher II may disincentivize universities from using race-
conscious admissions policies.  Next, Fisher II is similar to 
Adarand because it involves the tightening of a key part of equal 
protection analysis.  In addition, the Fisher II decision was an 
implicit, albeit indirect, prediction of Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action.  Fisher II and Schuette are important 
milestones on the twenty-five year journey towards the end of 
affirmative action. 
Though Fisher II may provide an exemplar for universities 
looking to enact a constitutionally permissible affirmative action 
program, Fisher II will decrease other universities’ willingness to 
risk liability for race-conscious admissions policies.  By 
continually holding universities’ feet to the fire over  
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race-conscious admissions policies, the Court has raised public 
universities’ operating costs.  Schools risk the threat of high 
stakes litigation.  As the University of California in Bakke, the 
University of Michigan in Grutter and Gratz, and the University 
of Texas in Fisher all experienced firsthand, litigation over 
admissions policies is a costly and time-consuming endeavor.  
Even with pro bono legal assistance from powerful amici, 
affirmative action lawsuits can eat away at precious 
administrative resources.  Further, schools risk negative press 
and public backlash from these controversial policies.  One 
compelling argument may become whether the cost of affirmative 
action policies outweigh the purported benefits of such programs.  
Finally, the court’s ruling mandates that schools acquiesce in an 
even more taxing review process before instituting race-conscious 
policies.  The time, energy, and manpower devoted to reviewing 
these policies will undoubtedly temper universities’ appetite for 
affirmative action policies.  Perhaps Fisher II is the conservative 
pragmatist’s way to eradicate affirmative action. 
Similarly to how Metro Broadcasting was flipped by 
Adarand, Fisher II transforms the old idea that narrow tailoring 
need not mean that every idea be tested into the idea that, in 
fact, every race-neutral plan must be thoroughly scrutinized and 
reviewed.374  The oft-refrain of pro-affirmative action pundits was 
that narrow tailoring does not mean that every race-neutral 
alternative must be tried and tested.375  However, Fisher II does 
mandate that courts absolutely consider all race-neutral 
possibilities.  The Fisher II Court tempered Grutter by explaining 
that “[c]onsideration by the university is . . . necessary, but it is 
not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny: The reviewing court must 
ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives 
would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”376  In this 
way, affirmative action proponents were dealt a major blow in 
Fisher II.  Although they claimed victory in the tepid affirmation 
of Grutter,377 proponents of affirmative action must realize that 
their days are numbered after Schuette.  The tightening of the 
availability of affirmative action plans in Fisher augured the 
?
374 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013). 
375 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). 
376 Fisher II, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
377 The Fisher II majority noted that the Court did not review Grutter’s validity 
because no party asked the court to review it. See id. at 2419. 
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Court’s ruling in Schuette that affirmative action can be 
constitutionally banned by state law.  Schuette is a clear 
indication that states retain the right to decide affirmative action 
questions.  In tandem, Schuette and Fisher II invite 
reexamination of Grutter. 
Though Fisher II may receive a cold reception from the legal 
academic community for being a “dud,” it is this uncertainty that 
makes the case interesting.  It certainly was not a game-
changing tectonic shift that transformed constitutional 
jurisprudence but Fisher II leaves the central holding of Grutter 
intact, while hinting that a direct challenge to Grutter will 
change its calculus.  Fisher II’s significance will be felt in more 
subtle and long-lasting ways; the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this 
case leaves the door open for the Supreme Court to affirm 
affirmative action or to eviscerate it.  The door was left open by 
the decision in Schuette as well, which implies that the Court 
may allow states to decide on a case-by-case basis. 
The long-term outcome and lasting import of these cases 
cannot be fully realized until another challenge to affirmative 
action is before the Court, but Fisher II is still an important step 
towards realizing the end of affirmative action, as predicted by 
Justice O’Connor’s famous twenty-five year deadline from 
Grutter.378  Although Grutter is cited multiple times in the Fisher 
II opinion, Fisher II does not explicitly comment on Justice 
O’Connor’s prediction that affirmative action would no longer be 
needed in twenty-five years.  Though the official Grutter 
prophecy does not expire until 2028, these cases open the door for 
change and the next twelve years will certainly bring shifts in 
the affirmative action landscape.  The educational disparity 
between races and social classes is increasing,379 and the need for 
some mechanism to ensure that there is an opportunity for all to 
reach the highest echelons of education remains.  However, the 
general tightening of the narrow tailoring prong and tepid 
acceptance of Grutter signal that the Court is moving, with 
exquisite irony, towards an affirmative action jurisprudence 
intolerant of race-conscious admissions plans.  Affirmative action 
?
378 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
379 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHNIC AND RACIAL DISPARITIES 
IN EDUCATION: PSYCHOLOGY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING 
DISPARITIES 14 (2012), available at http://www.apa.org/ed/resources/racial-
disparities.pdf. 
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is in a midlife crisis.  Taken together, Fisher II and Schuette 
suggest that affirmative action has seen its heyday but is not 
over yet.  Without tenable guidelines for universities to follow, 
the Court leaves open questions in these decisions.  The United 
States is in the middle of the journey towards Justice O’Connor’s 
utopian society, and until then, affirmative action remains the 
key to creating political proportionality of racial and economic 
minority groups. 
 
